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Recent Changes to Canada’s
Financial Sector Legislation
Fred Daniel, Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis
• Canada’s federal ﬁnancial-institutions
legislation is reviewed at least every ﬁve
years. The most recent update took place in
October 2001 with the coming into force of
Bill C–8.
• The legislation maintains the principle of
wide ownership of large banks.
• The legislation provides a holding company
option that could give banks and life
insurance companies additional ﬂexibility in
the way they structure their organizations.
• A process has been established to review
merger proposals among large banks.
• The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
has been created, with responsibility for
enforcing the consumer-related provisions of
statutes governing federal ﬁnancial
institutions.
• The new Canadian Payments Act makes
changes to the Canadian Payments
Association as well as the access to, and
governance of, the payments system.
ince 1992, when signiﬁcant changes were
made to the statutes governing federal ﬁnan-
cial institutions,1 the practice of reviewing
the legislation governing Canada’s banks on
a regular basis was extended to reviewing the legisla-
tion governing all federal ﬁnancial institutions. Most
recently, on 24 October 2001, Bill C–8, the legislation to
reform Canada’s ﬁnancial sector, was implemented
with the coming into force of some of the key technical
regulations that are essential to the operation of the
Act.2 Bill C–8, which capped a process that began in
1996, addressed the legislative framework for the
ﬁnancial sector, which includes domestic and foreign
banks, insurance companies, trust companies, the
credit union system, and other ﬁnancial institutions.
This article chronicles the signiﬁcant legislative devel-
opments that have occurred in the ﬁnancial services
sector over the past decade and gives an overview of
some of the key provisions contained in Bill C–8. The
ﬁrst part of the article provides background informa-
tion on some of the major restructuring trends that
have taken place in the sector since the early 1990s.
The next section reviews the legislative changes that
affected federal ﬁnancial institutions over the period
1992-–2001,includingﬁnancial-institutionsupervision
and deposit insurance, and oversight of payments
1. For a description of how the institutional framework of Canada’s ﬁnancial
sector evolved up to the early 1990s, as well as a more complete discussion of
the 1992 financial sector legislation, see Daniel, Freedman, and Goodlet (1992–93).
2.  Bill C–8, “An Act to establish the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada
and to amend certain Acts in relation to ﬁnancial institutions.” The legislation
was introduced in Parliament in June 2000 as Bill C–38, but that legislation
died on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved with the call of the
2000 federal election.
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and other clearing and settlement systems. This is
followed by an outline of the process that led to the
2001 ﬁnancial sector legislation and an examination of
some of the important measures it contains. Finally,
the new Canadian Payments Act, including broaden-
ing access to the payments system, is discussed.
Financial Sector Restructuring
Canada’s ﬁnancial sector experienced signiﬁcant
changes over the past decade as it responded to such
factors as technological innovation, globalization, and
a low and stable rate of inﬂation. Shifting demograph-
ics also exerted important effects, as Canada’s aging
population increased its focus on retirement savings
and asset accumulation. This change in savings
behaviour contributed to a convergence of functions
among ﬁnancial institutions as they sought ways to
position themselves to maximize their share of the
asset- and wealth-management business.
Some important legislative developments also facili-
tated the changes in the ﬁnancial sector. Over the
years, legislative amendments have accommodated
the desire of ﬁnancial institutions to diversify their
activities, resulting in the continued blurring of dis-
tinctions between the various types of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. As well, large financial groups or conglomerates
that offer a variety of ﬁnancial products and services
have been created. This trend has been particularly
evident in the banking sector, where some institutions
own specialized subsidiaries that provide different
ﬁnancial service products.3 Another feature of the
restructuring in recent years has been the demutuali-
zation of several large life insurance companies (dis-
cussed on p. 6).
In addition, considerable consolidation has occurred
during the past 15 years in the deposit-taking sector
through mergers and acquisitions. With the acquisi-
tion of several large trust companies by chartered
banks, non-bank-owned trust companies now consti-
tute a relatively small segment of the deposit-taking
industry (see Chart 1). The life insurance sector has
not only been affected by merger and acquisition
3. For example, since 1987, federal ﬁnancial institutions have been allowed to
own securities dealers. Since then, the major banks have made substantial
investments in the securities business by buying existing investment dealers
or by creating their own securities operations. Currently, bank-owned securi-
ties dealers dominate the integrated, full-service market, while several
smaller securities dealers offer niche services to retail and institutional clients.
activity, but has also experienced a number of with-
drawals resulting from foreign insurers selling their
operations to Canadian insurance companies as well
as some company failures. Cross-sector acquisitions
between deposit-taking institutions and insurance
companies have not played a major role in the consol-
idation of the ﬁnancial sector in Canada.
With regard to their geographical reach, Canadian
banks have long had extensive foreign operations,
booked primarily in foreign currencies. This reﬂects
Canada’s important trade activities, as well as the
sophistication of Canada’s banks and their efforts to
seek growth opportunities outside the country. For-
eign currency assets account for roughly 40 per cent of
total Canadian bank assets (see Chart 2). Some Cana-
dian banks have adopted a market strategy that
focuses on North America and involves such business
activities as wealth management, corporate and
investment banking, and electronic banking. The
international operations of Canadian life insurance
companies have also become increasingly important.
More than one-half of their total premium income cur-
rently derives from foreign sources, compared with
slightly more than one-third in 1990 (see Chart 3).
Chart 1
Canadian Deposit-Taking Institutions: Total Assets
* Excludes bank-owned trust and mortgage subsidiaries
** 2002 refers to data up to second quarter
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Chart 2
Canadian Banks: Trend in Canadian-Dollar Assets
versus Foreign Currency Assets


















Legislation governing federal ﬁnancial
institutions
In 1992, the process of updating the regulatory frame-
work for federal ﬁnancial institutions4 was made
more formal when the government incorporated sun-
set clauses in the relevant acts requiring that the legis-
lation be reviewed at ﬁve-year intervals.5 The primary
statutes forming this framework are the Bank Act, the
Insurance Companies Act, the Trust and Loan Compa-
nies Act, and the Cooperative Credit Associations Act.
1992 amendments
The 1992 legislation continued the process of removing
the legal barriers separating the activities of various
types of ﬁnancial institutions. It involved signiﬁcant
changes to the statutes governing banks, trust compa-
nies, and insurance companies and dealt with the
powers of ﬁnancial institutions, ownership, and ways
of managing self-dealing6 and conﬂicts of interest.
The amendments gave federal ﬁnancial institutions
the power to diversify into new lines of business
through ﬁnancial-institution subsidiaries, as well as
through increased in-house powers.7 Institutions
without the power to provide ﬁduciary services (e.g.,
trustee, executor, and administrator services), such as
banks and life insurance companies, were allowed to
own trust companies. Similarly, banks and trust and
loan companies were permitted to own insurance
companies. Finally, widely held, regulated, non-bank
financialinstitutionswerepermittedtoownScheduleII
4.  In Canada, banks are under exclusive federal jurisdiction, while trust and
loan companies and life insurance companies can be incorporated under
either federal or provincial legislation. The cooperative credit union system
operates almost entirely under provincial jurisdiction, although the Credit
Union Central of Canada, which is a national organization that provides
credit unions with technical and ﬁnancial support services, is incorporated
under federal legislation.
5.  This practice sets Canada apart from most other countries. Of course, the
government can revisit the legislation prior to the ﬁve-year reviews, if neces-
sary, to address any immediate concerns. Among the various statutes regulat-
ing ﬁnancial institutions before 1992, only the Bank Act contained a sunset
clause that called for a review of that legislation every 10 years.
6. Self-dealing refers primarily to transactions between a ﬁnancial institution
and either its controlling ownership group or non-ﬁnancial and unregulated
ﬁnancial afﬁliates controlled by the owner.
7.  There were certain limitations to these powers, in particular, restrictions
on the networking of most types of insurance through branches of federal
deposit-taking institutions and the prohibition on federal financial institutions
from engaging in car leasing or owning a car-leasing company.
Chart 3
Canadian Life and Health Insurers: Premium
Income
Source: Canadian Life and Health Insurance Facts, 2002
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banks, i.e., closely held banks, without the require-
ment that applies to other entities for divestiture of
signiﬁcant positions within 10 years.8 As for in-house
powers, life insurance companies were generally given
full consumer and commercial lending powers, and
banks were permitted to offer portfolio-management
advice. As a result of the 1992 amendments, Canadian
ﬁnancial institutions were able to develop into con-
glomerates operating in a variety of ﬁnancial areas.
But limitations on investments in non-financial
businesses meant that they could not become universal
banks with downstream links to commercial companies.
The 1992 legislation also addressed the competitive
equity aspect of imposing non-interest-bearing
reserve requirements on banks and not on other
deposit-taking institutions. Reserve requirements on
banks were phased out over two years, removing the
unequal treatment of institutions competing for the
same business.
1997 amendments
The primary objective of the 1997 review of ﬁnancial-
institutions legislation was to determine whether the
substantial changes implemented in 1992 were func-
tioning as intended. In the event, it was felt that the
legislative framework was generally working well,
and only minor changes were implemented to update
and ﬁne-tune the legislation. The 1997 amendments
also included provisions to deal with consumer pri-
vacy and tied selling.
Demutualization of life insurance companies
Legislation in March 1999 allowed Canada’s largest
mutually owned life insurance companies (i.e., those
owned by insurance policyholders) to convert to public
stock companies owned by shareholders, through a
process known as demutualization. The legislation set
out the procedures required to demutualize, including
the requirement to secure the approval of the converting
company’s policyholders with voting rights. The
regime also contained a number of safeguards to protect
policyholder interests throughout the demutualiza-
tion process. For companies choosing to demutualize,
there are many beneﬁts. Policyholders can realize on
the value of their company through the shares they
receive upon demutualization, the ﬁrm can have
increased and more ﬂexible access to markets to raise
capital, the ﬁrm’s common shares can be used as an
acquisition currency in purchasing other ﬁnancial
8.  For a more detailed description of Schedule II banks, see footnote 23,
below.
service ﬁrms, and the ﬁrm can use options and share-
purchase plans to attract and keep highly skilled
employees. At the same time, demutualized companies
can become potential takeover targets.
The legislation required that, in the two years following
demutualization, demutualized insurance companies
remain widely held, i.e., no individual or entity would
be allowed to own more than 10 per cent of the shares
of the company. In addition, no mergers among, or
acquisitionsof,demutualizedfirmswereallowedduring
this two-year transition period.9 These restrictions
were intended to give management of the newly
demutualized companies time to adjust to operating
as stock companies.
Before the coming into force of the demutualization
legislation, four of the ﬁve largest Canadian life insur-
ance companies were mutually owned. Within a year
of implementing the legislation, Canada’s ﬁve largest
life insurance companies were stock companies.10
Entry of foreign bank branches into Canada
In June 1999, legislation was passed allowing foreign
banks to establish operations in Canada without having
to set up Canadian-incorporated subsidiaries.11 Foreign
banks can establish full-service branches or lending
branches. Full-service branches are not permitted to
take deposits of less than $150,000, while lending
branches are not permitted to take any deposits from
the public and are restricted to borrowing only from
otherfinancialinstitutions.12Exceptfortheserestrictions
on deposit-taking, foreign bank branches have essen-
tially the same business powers as foreign bank sub-
sidiaries and domestic banks.
An important reason for allowing foreign banks to
enter Canada via branch banks is to enable them to
use their larger home capital base to support lending
activities in Canada. Because foreign bank branches
9. The 2001 financial sector legislation set a common end-date of 31 December
2001forthetwo-yeartransitionperiodsofthedemutualizedinsurancecompanies
(see p. 10, below).
10.  The following companies demutualized after the legislation came into
force: Canada Life Insurance Company, Manufacturers Life Insurance
Company, Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, and Clarica Life Insur-
ance Company (formerly The Mutual Life Assurance Company of Canada).
11.  In February 1997, the government announced its intention to allow
foreign banks to branch into Canada. It issued a public consultation paper on
foreign bank entry policy later that year.
12.  One reason for restricting retail deposit-taking by foreign bank branches
is that it would entail prudential risks if deposit insurance were provided to
entities where the primary regulator was in a foreign jurisdiction and where
there was no legal corporate entity in Canada.7 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
are not permitted to take retail deposits, they also face
somewhat lighter Canadian regulatory requirements
than foreign bank subsidiaries. Overall, the foreign
bank entry regime offers foreign banks greater
ﬂexibility with respect to how they provide ﬁnancial
services in Canada. Foreign banks that are interested
in entering Canada primarily to provide commercial
banking services may wish to enter Canada as foreign
bank branches; those that want to engage in retail
deposit-taking also have the option of establishing a
separate subsidiary in Canada for that purpose. (Total
assets of foreign bank subsidiaries and foreign bank
branches are shown in Chart 4.)13
Financial-institution supervision and
deposit insurance
Following the failure and near-failure of a number of
non-bank ﬁnancial institutions in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the federal government undertook a
review of the prudential regulation and supervision of
Canada’s ﬁnancial sector. The government empha-
sized the importance of a policy of early intervention
13.  As of December 2002, 68 banks were operating in Canada, of which 15
were domestic banks, 33 were foreign bank subsidiaries, 17 were full-service
foreign bank branches, and 3 were foreign bank lending branches.
Chart 4
Foreign Bank Subsidiaries and Foreign Bank
Branches: Total Assets



















in, and resolution of, institutions experiencing ﬁnan-
cial difﬁculty.14 The review culminated in legislation
in June 1996 that gave the Ofﬁce of the Superintendent
of Financial Institutions (OSFI), which is responsible
for the prudential supervision of federal ﬁnancial
institutions, a clearer statutory mandate. OSFI’S mission
includes safeguarding policyholders and depositors
from undue loss. It also promotes and administers
a regulatory framework that provides for the early
identiﬁcation and resolution of compliance or opera-
tional issues that could threaten the safety and sound-
ness of ﬁnancial institutions. There will be times when
OSFI has to intervene to protect policyholders and
depositors, but it is not OSFI’S role to provide a failure-
proof system; rather, the ultimate responsibility for
running safe and sound institutions rests with the
management and board of directors of each institution.
To enhance the transparency of the intervention process,
OSFI and the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation
(CDIC) jointly developed a guide setting out what
measures they will take if the condition of a ﬁnancial
institution deteriorates. In addition, toreduce losses to
depositors, policyholders, and creditors, the legisla-
tion was amended to make it easier for the Superin-
tendent to close an institution in ﬁnancial difﬁculty
while it still has some capital.
The 1996 legislation also allowed the CDIC, which had
a system of ﬂat-rate deposit-insurance premiums, to
develop a system of risk-based premiums, i.e., a pre-
mium system that is differentiated on the basis of the
risk proﬁles of individual deposit-taking institutions.
The main objective of using risk-based premiums is to
provide an incentive for deposit-taking institutions to
follow more prudent policies in the conduct of their
business. In March 1999, the CDIC introduced a differ-
ential premium system. Under this system, CDIC
member institutions are classified into one of four
premium categories, with the classiﬁcation based on
a system that scores institutions according to certain
quantitative and qualitative factors.
The 1997 amendments to the financial sector legislation
allowed banks that accept only wholesale deposits
($150,000 or more), but do not take retail deposits, to
opt out of CDIC coverage. Institutions opting out can
thus avoid the reporting and other requirements
associated with CDIC membership. CDIC bylaws on
opting out were put in place in October 1999.15
14.   Canada (1995).
15.  Since 1999, 12 foreign bank subsidiaries have chosen to opt out of CDIC
membership.8 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
Oversight of the payments and other
clearing and settlement systems
The 1996 legislation to strengthen the supervisory and
regulatory framework for federal ﬁnancial institutions
also established the Payment Clearing and Settlement
Act (PCSA), giving the Bank of Canada responsibility
for the oversight of payments and other clearing and
settlement systems in Canada for the purpose of con-
trolling systemic risk.16 Under the PCSA, systems that
have the potential to create systemic risk are desig-
nated as being subject to the PCSA. The Bank of Canada
oversees designated systems on a continuing basis for
the appropriate control of systemic risk. In addition,
the PCSA contains provisions which, when combined
with federal insolvency legislation, reinforce the legal
enforceability of netting in designated clearing and
settlement systems. Other PCSA provisions make the
settlement rules of designated systems immune to
legal stays or other legal challenges, even in cases
where a participant in one of these systems fails.17
Thus, the PCSA increases the certainty that the legal
arrangements governing the operations of a clearing
and settlement system will produce the expected out-
come in periods of ﬁnancial stress.
A consequence of the June 1999 legislation permitting
foreign bank-branching in Canada was an amend-
ment to the PCSA regarding the participation of for-
eign banks in major clearing and settlement systems.
A provision was added to the PCSA to allow the
Governor of the Bank of Canada to prohibit or impose
conditions on the participation of a full-service branch
or a lending branch of a foreign bank in a clearing and
settlement system designated under the PCSA if the
Governor is of the opinion that its participation poses,
or is likely to pose, a systemic risk or an unacceptable
risk to the Bank of Canada. If the Governor does not
prohibit their participation, the legislation permits
both types of branches to participate in designated
clearing and settlement systems, provided they meet
the requirements of those systems.
16.  Systemic risk refers to domino or spillover effects, whereby the inability
of one ﬁnancial institution to fulﬁll its payment obligations in a timely fashion
results in the inability of other ﬁnancial institutions to fulﬁll their obligations
in that clearing and settlement system or in other systems, or in the failure of
that clearing house or other clearing houses. For a discussion of the PCSA, see
Goodlet (1997).
17.  In June 2002, the PCSA was amended to clarify that similar legal protec-
tions apply to certain securities and derivatives clearing houses that are not
designated under the PCSA.
Background to the 2001 Legislation
In 1996, the government released a discussion paper
emphasizing the important changes occurring in the
ﬁnancial sector that reﬂected the globalization of
ﬁnancial services markets, technological advances,
and a changing competitive landscape.18 The govern-
ment also established the Task Force on the Future of
the Canadian Financial Services Sector to undertake a
comprehensive review of Canada’s ﬁnancial sector
and to provide advice on public policy issues related
to the development of an appropriate framework. The
work of the Task Force would help to shape the next
round of amendments to the ﬁnancial sector legisla-
tion, scheduled to take place no later than ﬁve years
after the 1997 legislation was passed.
The Task Force had a broad mandate to address issues
facing Canada’s ﬁnancial services industry and to
make recommendations on any public policy issues
that affect the environment within which the provid-
ers of such services operate. In September 1998, after
nearly two years of study and consultation, the Task
Force delivered its ﬁnal report.19 The Task Force con-
cluded that Canada’s ﬁnancial system is strong, that it
works well, and that institutions generally do a good
job with the services they offer. Still, it identiﬁed sev-
eral measures that could be implemented to help
ﬁnancialinstitutionsbettermeetfuturechallengesand
offered124recommendationsforenhancingcompetition
and competitiveness, improving the regulatory frame-
work, and empowering consumers.20
A Payments System Advisory Committee established
by the Department of Finance in 1996 to study issues
concerning payments systems also contributed to the
work of the Task Force. Co-chaired by the Department
of Finance and the Bank of Canada, the committee’s
purpose was to analyze the implications of broaden-
ing access to the payments system, and to analyze
whether modiﬁcations to its governance framework
18. Canada (1996). This document was also the basis for the 1997 amendments
to the ﬁnancial-institutions legislation.
19.  “Change, Challenge, Opportunity,” Report of the Task Force on the
Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector (Canada  1998). The report
is supported by 5 background papers and 18 research studies commissioned
by the Task Force. The report, background papers, and research studies are
available at the Task Force’s Web site (http://ﬁnservtaskforce.ﬁn.gc.ca/
index_e.htm).
20.  The Appendix highlights a few of the recommendations contained in the
report of the Task Force and the relevant initiatives in the 2001 ﬁnancial sector
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were needed for it to continue to develop in the public
interest.21 Discussions in the committee focused on
three public policy objectives for the payments system:
efﬁciency, safety, and the consideration of consumer
interests. It did not make recommendations but
discussed alternative legislative and regulatory arrange-
ments for the various elements of the payments
system and the trade-offs involved in choosing among
them.
After the Task Force had completed its review, the
government released a policy paper setting out the
policy framework that became the basis for the 2001
ﬁnancial sector legislation.22
The 2001 Legislation
The 2001 financial sector legislation was wide-ranging.
Its objectives were to promote the efﬁciency and
growth of the ﬁnancial sector, foster greater domestic
competition, improve the regulatory environment,
and empower and protect consumers. Certain provi-
sions in the legislation broaden the scope of invest-
ments that are permitted for federal financial
institutions in-house or through subsidiaries, thereby
providing them with opportunities to innovate and
bring new products to customers. The legislation also
makes it easier for these institutions to have signiﬁ-
cant partners in joint ventures and enhances the ability
of regulated ﬁnancial institutions to meet increasing
technological and competitive challenges from, for
example,unregulatedand“monoline”firmsspecializing
in a single line of business.
The remainder of this section discusses some of the
major reform initiatives, including the ownership
regime, the holding company regime, investment
powers, merger-review policy, accommodating struc-
tural ﬂexibility in the credit union system, regulatory
streamlining, and provisions relating to consumers.
Ownership regime
Banks
Since 1967, Canada’s bank-ownership regime has
been based on the principle of wide ownership of
21. The committee considered four discussion papers prepared and issued by
the Department of Finance and the Bank of Canada between March 1997 and
January 1998. The papers are available at the Department of Finance Web site
(www.ﬁn.gc.ca) and the Bank of Canada Web site (www.bank-banque-can-
ada.ca). Following the deliberations of the committee, the Department of
Finance released a ﬁnal discussion paper in July 1998, which is available at
the Department of Finance Web site.
22.  Canada (1999).
major banks.23 This policy has facilitated Canadian
control of domestic banks and is one approach that
can be used to address the prudential concerns related
to the potential for solvency-threatening self-dealing.
The 2001 legislation maintained the widely held own-
ership regime for banks but amended the Bank Act to
provide for an ownership regime that is based on size.
According to the legislation, banks are classiﬁed by
size to be
• large (greater than $5 billion in equity)
• medium ($1 billion to $5 billion in
equity), or
• small (less than $1 billion in equity)
Large banks are required to be widely held, as they
were before the new legislation.24 To give them the
ﬂexibility to enter into alliances or joint ventures,
however, the definition of “widely held” was
expanded to allow an individual investor to own
up to 20 per cent of any class of voting shares and
30 per cent of any class of non-voting shares of a large
bank.25 Any transaction where an investor applies to
acquire a signiﬁcant interest of a large bank, i.e., more
than 10 per cent, would require the approval of the
Minister of Finance and would be subject to a “ﬁt and
proper” test and assessed against a guideline designed
to prevent these institutions from becoming de facto
closely held. The legislation allows medium-sized
banks to be closely held, although they are required to
23.  Prior to the 2001 legislation, the ownership regime made a distinction
between Schedule I and Schedule II banks. Schedule I banks, which included
the six largest domestic banks, were required to be widely held, with no single
shareholder or group of associated persons holding more than 10 per cent of
any class of shares. Schedule II banks could be closely held and commercially
linked for the ﬁrst 10 years of their existence, after which they were required
to become widely held. Foreign banks and other eligible foreign and domestic
ﬁnancial institutions that themselves were widely held were permitted to
hold Schedule II banks indeﬁnitely in a closely held fashion.
24. Under the legislation, the widely held rule can be met by having the bank
held by a bank holding company that itself is widely held.
25.  Although the National Bank of Canada, the Laurentian Bank of Canada,
and Canadian Western Bank each have equity of less than $5 billion, the new
legislation treats these banks as entities with equity of more than $5 billion.
Thus, these banks are subject to the ownership rules applicable to large banks.
The Minister of Finance can revoke this treatment, in which case the bank
would not have to be widely held. The government’s policy is that the widely
held requirement will not be revoked unless the Minister receives an applica-
tion from the bank in question. Any request would be considered on its own
merits and would take into account a number of factors, including safety and
soundness, the prospects for the institution in the context of the global mar-
ketplace, the needs of consumers, the best interests of Canadians, and where
the institution operates principally in a certain region, the best interests of
those living in that region.10 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
have a public ﬂoat of at least 35 per cent of their voting
shares. Small banks are not subject to any ownership
restrictions. For the ﬁrst time, the legislation permits
commercial entities to own indeﬁnitely, on a closely
held basis, banks with less than $5 billion in equity.
Large banks are required to be
widely held.
To introduce greater organizational ﬂexibility, the new
legislation allows banks to incorporate one or more
Canadian banking subsidiaries. For example, a bank
can establish a retail bank subsidiary or commercial
bank subsidiary, and these subsidiaries could have
signiﬁcant outside investors.
Non-bank ﬁnancial institutions
In contrast to the ownership regime for banks, tradi-
tionally there has not been a widely held rule for fed-
erally regulated trust and loan companies or insurance
companies owned by shareholders. For these compa-
nies, approval from the Minister of Finance has been
required for any shareholding in excess of 10 per cent.
The 2001 amendments to the Insurance Companies
Act clariﬁed the transitional rules regarding owner-
ship restrictions affecting demutualized life insurance
companies (discussed above, on p. 6). A common end-
date of 31 December 2001 was set for the two-year
transition period of these companies, during which no
mergers among, or acquisitions of, demutualized
ﬁrms were allowed. Following the transition period,
merger restrictions applying to demutualized insurers
with equity under $5 billion were lifted and these firms
also became eligible to be closely held.26 In addition,
the government announced a policy whereby large
demutualized companies with over $5 billion in
equity are required to continue to be widely held; that
is, no person may own more than 20 per cent of the
company’s voting shares or more than 30 per cent of
26. After the transition period expired, Sun Life Financial Services of Canada
Inc. (which had equity of more than $5 billion) acquired Clarica Life Insurance
Company (which had equity of less than $5 billion). The transaction created
the largest life insurance company in Canada, and one of the top ﬁve publicly
traded North American life insurance companies, measured by market
capitalization.
any class of its non-voting shares.27 In addition, as a
matter of policy, large banks are not permitted to
acquire or merge with large demutualized insurance
companies, and vice versa. This restriction also applies
to large bank holding companies and large life insur-
ance holding companies.
The legislation also raised, from $750 million to $1 billion,
the threshold above which trust companies, stock life
insurance companies, and property and casualty
insurance companies must have a 35 per cent public
ﬂoat.
Holding company regime
The 2001 legislation introduced a holding company
regime for Canadian banks and insurance companies
that permits the creation of regulated non-operating
holding companies. The holding company regime
does not expand the powers of banks or insurance
companies—rather, its aim is to give institutions more
ﬂexibility in the way they structure their organiza-
tions, e.g., making it possible to shift various activities
of the bank into different parts of the organization. For
instance, a bank holding company could have a bank-
ing subsidiary, an insurance subsidiary, a securities
subsidiary, and a subsidiary for its unregulated busi-
nesses. This type of organizational structure might be
more understandable for investors and give the
organization more ﬂexibility to react to changes in the
competitive landscape. It might also relieve unregu-
lated activities from some regulatory oversight. The
holding company structure would also permit a bank
to separate various banking activities (e.g., consumer-
or business-lending activities, or its credit card business)
into separate afﬁliates.
The 2001 legislation introduced a
holding company regime for
Canadian banks and insurance
companies.
27.  Unlike the restrictions on bank ownership, the ownership restrictions on
life insurance companies were not placed in the legislation governing these
institutions. The Minister of Finance has the authority to withdraw the own-
ership constraints that apply to large demutualized insurance companies.11 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2002–2003
Under the legislation, bank holding companies are
regulated under the Bank Act and are required to have
an investment in at least one bank. Likewise, insurance
holding companies are regulated under the Insurance
Companies Act and are required to have an investment
in at least one life insurance company. The investments
that are permitted in the case of a bank holding com-
pany are the same investments in permitted entities
that a bank may make under the Bank Act. Similarly,
investments permitted for an insurance holding com-
pany are the same as those permitted for a life insurance
company under the Insurance Companies Act. Holding
companies are subject to consolidated supervision by
OSFI.
Market participants have expressed support for the
government’s initiative in introducing a holding com-
pany regime for banks and life insurance companies.
However, they have also indicated that the extent to
which institutions might adopt a holding company
structure will depend on various factors, including
whether it, in fact, results in lighter regulation for the
less-regulated afﬁliated companies in the holding
company group, how complex the self-dealing rules
applied in the case of afﬁliated companies would be,
and what capital rules would be applied to holding
companies by OSFI.28
Permitted investments
A broader range of investments is
permitted, including expanded
opportunities for investment in the
area of e-commerce.
The 2001 legislation has continued the approach of
limiting financial-institution investments in commercial
enterprises. However, within this general limitation,
the new rules do provide some relaxation of the
investment regime. A broader range of investments
is permitted, including expanded opportunities for
investment in the area of e-commerce. The legislation
28. OSFI has been consulting with industry associations on a framework for
capital adequacy for holding companies. At the time of writing, these consul-
tations had not yet been ﬁnalized.
broadens the range of information-processing activities
that federally regulated financial institutions can
engage in to include data transmission systems, infor-
mationsites,communicationdevices,andinformation
platforms or portals. As a general principle, under the
new legislation any activity permitted to be carried
out in-house by a financial institution can also be carried
out through a subsidiary of the ﬁnancial institution or
its holding company. This change is intended to give
banks and insurance companies greater choice and
ﬂexibility in the way they structure their operations.
For example, allowing banks to have additional sub-
sidiaries could facilitate alliances and joint ventures.
New merger-review policy
The government introduced
guidelines setting out a review
process for merger proposals among
large banks.
The government has acknowledged that large-bank
mergers can be a viable business strategy.29 Two issues
that are relevant for public policy are determining the
size an institution needs to be to compete in the global
marketplace, and the importance of not unduly con-
centrating economic power or signiﬁcantly reducing
competitiondomestically.Alongwiththe2001financial
sector legislation, the government introduced guide-
lines setting out a review process for merger proposals
among large banks and bank holding companies with
over $5 billion in equity.30 The review process includes
a formal mechanism for public input.
Under the merger-review policy, the merger partners
are required to prepare a public interest impact assess-
ment (PIIA). This assessment covers various effects of
the merger, such as job losses and branch closures, as
well as the impact the transaction may have on the
structure of the banking industry and the international
competitiveness of Canadian banks. In the PIIA, the
merger partners would also set out any remedial or
29.  Canada (2001a).
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mitigating steps they would be prepared to take (such
as divestitures, service guarantees, and other commit-
ments) in respect of public interest concerns that they
identify. The matter would then be referred to the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance
and the Standing Senate Committee on Banking,
Trade, and Commerce for consideration and public
hearings. Each of these committees would report to
the Minister on the broad public interest issues raised
by the proposed merger.31
The Competition Bureau and OSFI would also review
the merger proposal and report to the Minister of
Finance their views on the competitive and prudential
aspects, respectively, of the proposed transaction. The
Minister would make these reports public.
The Minister of Finance, after taking into account the
various factors, would decide whether the proposal
would be allowed to proceed in light of any prudential,
competition, and other public interest concerns. If the
Minister considered these concerns too great to be
remedied, the transaction would be denied. Or, if
these concerns could be addressed, the process would
enter the negotiation of remedies stage.
The Competition Bureau would negotiate the compe-
tition remedies, and OSFI, the prudential remedies
with the merger applicants, and the two agencies
would work with the Department of Finance to coor-
dinate a complete set of public interest remedies.
Following successful negotiations, the Minister of
Finance would approve the transaction with terms
and conditions that reﬂect those remedies.
Proposed mergers involving demutualized insurance
companies that have $5 billion or more of equity will
not be subjected to the formal merger-review policy.
Nevertheless, in any merger involving demutualized
companies, the Minister is authorized to consider the
Superintendent’s opinion as to whether the newly
merged company would present supervisory or regu-
latory concerns. In addition, the Competition Bureau
can assess the transaction.
31.   In October 2002, the Minister of Finance and the Secretary of State (Inter-
national Financial Institutions) asked the House of Commons Standing Com-
mittee on Finance and the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade, and
Commerce for their views on the major considerations that would apply in
determining whether a merger proposal between large banks is in the public
interest. The Senate committee issued its report on this matter in December,
and the House of Commons committee is expected to issue its report in early
2003.
Accommodating structural ﬂexibility in the
credit union system
The 2001 legislation enables the credit union system,
if it wishes to do so, to move from the current three-
tiered structure—local credit unions, provincial credit
union centrals, and the national credit union central—
to a two-tiered structure consisting of local credit
unions and a national services entity. This could provide
a mechanism for participating credit unions to take
advantage of economies of scale, reduce costs, eliminate
duplication and overlap, and promote stronger coor-
dination with an enhanced national presence. To date,
no initiatives from the credit union system involving
the new provisions have been ﬁnalized.32
Streamlining regulatory approvals
The 2001 legislation made two improvements to
streamline the regulatory-approval process and
reduce the burden of compliance on federal ﬁnancial
institutions. First, several applications formerly
requiring ministerial approval are now subject to OSFI
approval. Second, OSFI has implemented a deemed
approvals process in order to speed up the supervi-
sory approvals required for certain corporate actions.
Under this process, when institutions file an application
with OSFI, the Superintendent has a 30-day period in
which to raise concerns, seek further information, or
indicate that there will be a delay. If none of these
actions is taken, the transaction is deemed to have
been approved. The Superintendent can also explicitly
approve or deny the transaction before the end of the
30-day period.
Provisions relating to consumers
Consumer-related issues were an important focus of
the 2001 ﬁnancial sector legislation. A signiﬁcant initi-
ative was the establishment of the Financial Consumer
Agency of Canada (FCAC). The purpose of the FCAC
is to enforce the consumer-oriented provisions of the
federal ﬁnancial institution statutes, monitor the
ﬁnancial services industry’s self-regulatory initiatives
to protect the interests of consumers and small busi-
nesses, promote consumer awareness, and respond to
32. The Credit Union Central of British Columbia and the Credit Union Central
of Ontario have announced their intention to explore a merger. The two pro-
vincially chartered credit union centrals provide a range of ﬁnancial services
to credit unions in their respective provinces, including liquidity management,
wholesale lending, and settlement of cheques and electronic payment items.
The proposed merger envisions creating a single, federally regulated organi-
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general consumer inquiries. The FCAC consolidates
the oversight of consumer-protection measures in the
federally regulated ﬁnancial sector, which previously
had been dispersed among a number of federal entities.
The FCAC can impose monetary penalties in cases of
contravention or non-compliance with consumer-
related statutes. The FCAC reports to the Minister of
Finance.
The FCAC consolidates the oversight
of consumer-protection measures in
the federally regulated ﬁnancial
sector.
The legislation also requires institutions to be members
of a third-party dispute-resolution mechanism. The
government initially indicated that it would work
with ﬁnancial institutions to establish the Canadian
Financial Services Ombudsman (CFSO), which banks
would be required to join. Non-bank ﬁnancial institu-
tions could join either the CFSO or a different system
for resolving third-party disputes. In December 2001,
the government announced that it was suspending its
plan to establish the CFSO, but that it would support a
private sector initiative to develop a National Finan-
cial Sector Ombudservice (NFSO) that would handle
consumer complaints involving various types of
ﬁnancial institutions. Work has proceeded on estab-
lishing this consumer-assistance service, now called
the Financial Services OmbudsNetwork.
Another government initiative aims at making basic
ﬁnancial services accessible to all individuals. Under
the legislation, the federal government has the authority
to make regulations regarding the provision by banks
of a low-cost account to customers. Currently, the gov-
ernment has chosen not to regulate low-cost accounts
through legislation; instead, it is relying on the banks’
commitment to provide such accounts through a self-
regulatory approach.33 The FCAC monitors banks to
33.  In February 2001, the government announced the signing of memoranda
of understanding with several banks regarding the features that these low-
cost accounts will offer. See Canada (2001c).
ensure that such accounts are offered and that they
meet certain standards. Should the self-regulatory
approach be unsuccessful, the government has the
option of imposing regulations.
The Canadian Payments Act and
Access to the Payments System
As part of the 2001 legislative package, the Canadian
Payments Association Act has been renamed the
Canadian Payments Act (CP Act). The CP Act contains
some important changes for the Canadian Payments
Association (CPA), a non-proﬁt association created by
an Act of Parliament in 1980. The CPA owns and oper-
ates Canada’s two domestic currency payments sys-
tems through which all non-cash payments ultimately
settle. The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is the
principal system for clearing large-value and time-
sensitive payments. The Automated Clearing Settle-
ment System (ACSS) handles all other payments, such
as paper cheques, automated bill payments, and debit
card transactions. The CPAdevelops, implements, and
updates the rules that govern the clearing and settle-
ment of payments through the LVTS and the ACSS.
The CP Act extends eligibility for
CPAmembership to life insurance
companies, securities dealers, and
money market mutual funds.
Before the 2001 legislation was enacted, CPA member-
ship was limited to the Bank of Canada; the other
banks, trust and loan companies, credit unions and
caisses populaires centrals; and other deposit-taking
institutions. The CP Act extends eligibility for CPA
membership to life insurance companies, securities
dealers, and money market mutual funds. Under the
previous legislation, the CPA had a twofold mandate
to establish and operate the national clearing and set-
tlements system and to plan the evolution of the
national payments system. Under the CP Act, the stat-
utory objectives of the CPA have been amended and
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(i) to establish and operate national
systems for the clearing and settle-
ment of payments and other
arrangements for the making or
exchange of payments
(ii) to facilitate the interaction of the
CPA’S systems with others involved
in the exchange, clearing, and settle-
ment of payments, and
(iii) to facilitate the development of new
payment methods and technologies.
In pursuing these objectives, the CPA promotes the
efﬁciency, safety, and soundness of its clearing and
settlement systems, taking into account users’ interests.
The CP Act has increased the size of the CPA’SBoard of
Directors from 11 to 16 members.34 The increased size
reﬂects the broader range of entities that are eligible
for CPA membership as well as three new independ-
ent board members appointed by the Minister of
Finance. In addition, the Stakeholder Advisory Council,
which was established in 1996, has been enshrined in
the CPAct. Its mandate is to provide advice to the CPA
Board on the payments system from the perspectives of
a variety of interest groups. The Stakeholder Advisory
Council is made up of two CPA directors and up to 18
other members who are appointed by the CPA Board
of Directors in consultation with the Minister of
Finance.
The CP Act provides the Minister of Finance with cer-
tain oversight powers in relation to the CPA. All CPA
rules and standards, including any amendments, are
subject to a 30-day review period by the Minister of
Finance, who can disallow any rule that is not deemed
to be in the public interest. The Minister also has the
authority to issue a directive to the CPA to make,
amend, or repeal a bylaw, rule, or standard.
Under the CP Act, the Minister also has the authority,
if it is considered to be in the public interest, to desig-
nate a particular payments system that is national in
scope or that plays a major role in supporting transac-
tionsintheCanadianfinancialmarketsortheCanadian
economy. In designating such a payments system, the
Minister would consider the level of ﬁnancial safety
provided by that payments system to the participants
and users, the efﬁciency and competitiveness of pay-
ments systems generally in Canada, and the best inter-
34.  The chair of the Board of Directors continues to be an ofﬁcer of the Bank
of Canada.
ests of the Canadian ﬁnancial system. The Minister
can issue directives to such payments systems with
respect to the conditions for becoming a participant in
the system, the operation of the payments system, its
interaction with other Canadian payments systems,
and the relationship of the system with users. To date,
the Minister has not designated any system under the
CP Act.
To facilitate the coordination of the Bank of Canada’s
oversight responsibilities under the Payment Clearing
and Settlement Act and the Minister’s oversight activ-
ities under the CP Act, as well as to address payment
system issues in general, a non-statutory body called
thePaymentsAdvisoryCommittee(PAC)wasformed.
PAC is co-chaired by senior ofﬁcers of the Department
of Finance and the Bank of Canada.
As mentioned above, under the CP Act, life insurance
companies, securities dealers, and money market
mutual funds are eligible for membership in the CPA.
Permitting these types of ﬁnancial entities to join the
CPA enables them to offer a wider range of services to
theirclients,thuspromotingincreasedcompetitionfor
the consumer’s business. For example, life insurance
companies would be able to offer payment services with
features broadly similar to those of deposit accounts
offered by banks.
The CPA had considered removing the minimum vol-
ume criterion as an eligibility requirement for partici-
pation as a direct clearer in the ACSS, which requires
that at least 0.5 per cent of total payments volume in
the ACSS be cleared by a direct clearer, but this crite-
rion has been retained pending further study and con-
sultation with the Bank of Canada and the Department
of Finance on the implications of eliminating it. The
study will identify issues that presently motivate this
restriction and also examine alternative conditions
that might be more effective and efﬁcient than those
currently in place. Meanwhile, the government has
requested the CPA in its relevant bylaw to restrict the
participation of life insurance companies and money
market mutual funds to the status of indirect clearers;
that is, these entities would be required to have a
direct clearer acting as their agent in the ACSS clearing
and settlement process.35 As regards the LVTS, the
newly eligible CPA members could become direct
35.  In its policy paper (Canada 1999, p. 41) the government explained that
the legal framework within which these organizations operate is signiﬁcantly
different from those of other CPA members, and consequently their participa-
tion as direct clearers could impact the degree of risk assumed by other par-
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participants in the LVTS by complying with the crite-
ria set out by the CPA.36
Conclusion
Signiﬁcant changes have occurred in Canada’s ﬁnan-
cial services sector during the past decade. While
many factors were involved, amendments to legisla-
36.  To become a direct participant in the LVTS, an institution must be a
member of the CPA, have certain operational capabilities, have a settlement
account at the Bank of Canada, and enter into agreements relating to taking
loans from the central bank and to pledging the appropriate collateral. To
date, none of the institutions recently made eligible for CPA membership has
applied to become a member in the CPA.
tion governing the sector facilitated the process of
change by accommodating developments in the ﬁnan-
cial services industry. The result has been the creation
of a more competitive, innovative, and efﬁcient ﬁnan-
cial sector. At the same time, changes to the framework
for the prudential supervision of ﬁnancial institutions
and the oversight of clearing and settlement systems
have also contributed to public conﬁdence in a strong
ﬁnancial system. Given the evolutionary nature of
Canada’s ﬁnancial sector, the government and the
financial industry will soon begin planning and
preparing for the next legislative review required by
the ﬁve-year sunset clauses.
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Appendix
In 1996, the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian
Financial Services Sector was given the mandate to
make recommendations on any public policy issues
that affect the environment within which Canada’s
private sector ﬁnancial services providers operate.
The recommendations contained in the 1998 report of
the Task Force provided important input into the 2001
ﬁnancial sector legislation. In some cases, initiatives
recommended by the Task Force were implemented
by the government prior to the 2001 ﬁnancial sector
legislation. For example, in 1999, legislation was
passed regarding the demutualization of large life
insurance companies as well as legislation allowing
the entry of foreign bank branches into Canada. Over-
all, the 2001 legislative changes included several
major recommendations proposed by the Task Force.
In some cases, initiatives contained in the 2001 legisla-
tion were consistent with those recommended by the
Task Force, although the provisions for implementa-
tion may have differed from those suggested by the
Task Force.
With regard to the efﬁciency and growth of the ﬁnan-
cial sector, the 2001 ﬁnancial sector legislation incor-
porated the Task Force recommendations that the
deﬁnition of the widely held rule be broadened to pro-
vide for greater ﬂexibility in setting up strategic alli-
ances; a holding company regime be established to
provide for greater structural ﬂexibility; and a large
bank merger-review process be created to examine
whether merger proposals would be consistent with
the public interest.
As to fostering competition, the Task Force suggested
that there be direct access to the payments system for
life insurance companies, mutual funds, and invest-
ment dealers. In this regard, the new Canadian Pay-
ments Act makes these entities eligible to become
members in the Canadian Payments Association
(CPA).1 The Task Force also recommended that credit
1.  As noted in this article, the CPA, the Department of Finance, and the Bank
of Canada have agreed to study the impact of the elimination of the institu-
tional restrictions and the volume requirement for direct participation in the
Automated Clearing Settlement System.
unions be permitted to form cooperative banks.
Although a cooperative bank initiative was not
included in the 2001 ﬁnancial sector legislation, in
April 2002 the government launched a consultation
process to determine whether there is sufﬁcient con-
sensus to move forward with legislation implement-
ing a cooperative bank model. The recommendation
of the Task Force to allow banks and trust companies
to offer insurance and auto leasing to their customers
through their branches was not adopted in the legisla-
tion. Similarly, the legislation did not provide for the
integration of deposit insurance for banks and com-
pensation plans for life insurance companies, for rea-
sons of competitive equity, as suggested by the Task
Force.
The 2001 legislation followed up on the recommenda-
tions of the Task Force to streamline the process for
regulatory approvals, although the suggestion that
regulatory overlap be reduced by transferring the
regulatory responsibilities of CDIC to OSFI was not
adopted.
As for consumer-related issues, several initiatives con-
tained in the report of the Task Force were included in
the 2001 ﬁnancial sector legislation, such as the estab-
lishment of an ombudsman. The Financial Consumer
Agency of Canada (FCAC), which was created for the
purposes of educating consumers on their rights and
overseeing compliance by institutions with federal
consumer-protection measures, is also consistent with
the Task Force objective of empowering consumers.
The 2001 ﬁnancial sector legislation addressed the
Task Force proposal regarding the provision of access
to low-cost accounts to low-income individuals. In
implementing this initiative, the government is rely-
ing on banks to use a self-regulatory approach (the
government has also retained the option of imposing
regulations), rather than adopting the Task Force’s
suggestions such as having the government enter into
indemnity agreements with ﬁnancial institutions
regardingregularpaymentstolow-incomeindividuals,
which would eliminate the need for holds on govern-
ment cheques.